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The Rise of Covenant-Lite Bond Contracting  
Abstract  
We investigate the trading and yield effects of covenant-lite (cov-lite) high-yield bond contracts, 
which have a restricted (lite) set of covenants. The excluded covenants often are those that use 
accounting performance measures. Although much research has focused on the potential benefits of 
accounting as a basis for debt contracting, little is known about settings where it may be optimal to 
exclude accounting performance statistics from public debt contracts. We find that cov-lite high-yield 
bonds have a higher trading turnover and lower yield spreads. Our findings provide empirical support 
for theory which predicts, for optimal bond covenant design, that a trade-off between improving 
trading ease versus enhanced investor protection needs to be managed. These results enhance our 
understanding of the limits of accounting’s role in (bond) contracting design.  
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Accounting constructs can be of assistance when parties write financial contracts in debt markets 
(Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 2010). Although the potential benefits of debt contracting on 
accounting have been extensively explored, scant research investigates the effects of removing 
accounting covenants from debt contracts. This is the focus of the present study. This issue is 
particularly pertinent given substantial growth in the use of debt contracts with a restricted set of 
covenants (so called covenant light or cov-lite contracts) as a result of historically low yields and 
fundamental changes in trading platforms for debt instruments.  
 
We study the capital market effects of removing accounting-based covenants in high-yield bond 
contracts. Covenants impose restrictions to the company, such as the ability to pay shareholder 
dividends or taking on more debt. Covenant protections are typically extensive for high-yield bonds 
because of their high risk of default. However, when high risk investments are in strong demand, 
bond contracts may include fewer covenant protections, particularly accounting-related covenants 
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 2013). In thus study, we assess whether investors 
rationally trade off creditor protection provided by covenants for lower verification costs and easier 
trading. Examining this trade-off furthers our understanding of settings where it may be efficient to 
not base debt contracts on publicly disclosed accounting performance. That is, although accounting 
enriches the possible contracting space by allowing contract renegotiation to be conditioned upon 
periodic publicly reported performance, this may not always be optimal. Based upon the contract 
standardization driven liquidity theory of Ayotte and Bolton (2011), we observe the short-term effect 
of issuing high-yield cov-lite bonds on trading, turnover, and yields vis-à-vis the issuance of 
alternative high-yield bonds that are not cov-lite.1  
 
 
1Our study focusses on high-yield bonds, which typically have incurrence covenants but not maintenance covenants. 
Maintenance covenants require the borrower to comply with one or more financial covenants during each reporting period. 
For example, maintaining a certain debt to equity ratio or interest coverage ratio. Incurrence covenants require compliance  
with one or more financial covenants only upon the occurrence of certain actions of the borrower such as a debt issuance, 
dividend payment, or an acquisition. In our setting, cov-lite high-yield bonds are contracts with only incurrence covenants 
that do not rely on accounting numbers for the incurrence tests. Our definition of cov-liteness differs from that of Becker 
and Ivashina (2016) for leveraged loans. They identify cov-liteness as loan contracts with incurrence provisions and non-





We study high-yield public debt conrtracts for two reasons. First, the high-yield market provides a 
high-risk setting where creditor protection matters the most. The increase in high yield issues in recent 
times, particularly those with low covenant quality, has weaker investor protection (Smith 2017a, 
Scaggs 2017). Second, prior debt contracting literature only documents the cov-lite phenomenon in 
the leveraged loan market (Becker and Ivashina 2016; Berlin, Nini and Yu 2020; Billet, Elkamhi, 
Popov, and Pungaliya 2016; Ivashina and Vallee 2019; Prilmeier and Stulz 2019), thus little is known 
about cov-liteness in public debt markets where periodic accounting information is available. This 
lack of evidence contrasts with the growing frequency of cov-lite contracts in the high-yield market 
(Bahceli 2018; Mellow 2017; Santibanez 2014). For example, in June 2017 Moody’s reported that 
high-yield cov-lite bonds represented a record 60% of single-month issuance and a record of 47% of 
these bonds included in Moody’s covenant quality index (Scaggs 2017).  
 
We focus on the high-yield market because of the differences between high-yield bonds and leveraged 
loans. Historically, debt markets were essentially dichotomised into public debt (bonds) versus 
private debt (loans), with each market having distinct governance structures. Bonds were issued by 
firms registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with an investment grade 
rating. Typically, bonds did not have maintenance covenants because close monitoring was not 
viewed as necessary for these liquid securities. In contrast, loans were illiquid, issued by private firms, 
and usually held by banks which monitored the borrower via accounting maintenance covenants 
written into the terms of the private debt contracts.2 Previously, firms could only access the liquid 
bond market if they had a sufficiently good bond rating and were registered with the SEC, thus 
becoming subject to regular public reporting requirements. Because of the dramatic increase in 
securitized loan offerings, firms that do not qualify for an investment-grade rating can remain private 
and borrow through loans that resemble bonds i.e., loans that do not have maintenance covenants 
(referred to as cov-lite loans), Becker and Ivashina (2016), Berlin et al. (2020), and Prilmeier and 
Stulz (2019).3 However, cov-lite leveraged loans do not provide a suitable setting for our research 
 
2 According to Prilmeier and Stulz (2019, p. 2), “the sharp distinctions between loans and bonds started to disappear in 
the 1980s and the disappearance has accelerated”. We explain changes in debt markets in section 2. The principal factors 
responsible for the convergence were, on the one hand, the introduction of high-yield (junk) bonds and, on the other hand, 
securitization and trading of loans along with more recent historically low yields. 
3 De Fontenay (2014), p.744, explains that “The once-universal truth that loans come saddled with tight covenants and 
intensive creditor monitoring is also proving false, and syndication and secondary trading are again the culprits. While 
bank loans were always characterized by highly restrictive covenants, this feature could not peacefully coexist with 
funding by dispersed, unrelated creditors.” Covenant-lite loans first appeared around 2005 and rapidly became popular in 
the leveraged loan market. Because financial covenants were a defining feature of bank loans for so long, covenant-lite 
loans were dismissed as a sign of lender excess in the pre-financial crisis period. Yet the market share of covenant-lite 







question, which relates to the effects of excluding accounting from covenants, because many loans 
are issued by private firms that do not publicly disclose financial reports. Our focus is on public firms 
regulated by the SEC which, by default, publish financial reports. Therefore, their decision about 
whether to have debt contracts that exclude accounting covenants is not influenced by the decision to 
remain private.  
 
Despite similarities between leveraged loans and high-yield contracts, high-yield bonds remain riskier 
investments, which suggests that accounting covenants are potentially more important in providing 
protection to high-yield bond investors. There are several reasons that high-yield bonds are riskier 
than leveraged loans. First, bonds typically pay out fixed interest, whereas leveraged loans often offer 
floating-rate interest making leveraged loan investors not subject to interest rate risk. Second, 
leveraged loans tend to be secured by the company assets and are the first in line to be paid, whereas 
most bonds are unsecured and subordinate to leveraged loans (De Fontenay 2014). Third, loans are 
often based on relationship lending, which facilitates information flows about the borrower’s financial 
situation. Finally, recovery rates upon default are substantially higher for leveraged loans than for 
high-yield bonds.4 In section 2, we provide a schematic explanation of the evolution of covenant 
structures for leveraged loans and high-yield bonds. 
 
Christensen et al. (2016, p.414) focus on the role of accounting information in financial contracting. 
They argue that incomplete contracting theory complements traditional agency theory in explaining 
accounting-based contracting. For instance, they argue that “Accounting based covenants serve as a 
mechanism for allocating control rights between borrowers and lenders in an efficient manner, that 
is, in a manner that minimizes opportunistic behavior. Another important takeaway from the 
incomplete contracting framework is that covenants are valuable because they can be renegotiated. 
This gives a strategic meaning to the use of covenants in that they can be used to provide incentives 
and alleviate information problems, making them an integral part of a borrower’s corporate 
governance.” However, as we explain below, this view of the contracting role of accounting has been 




4 Between 2013 and 2017, the average recovery rate for US first lien loans was 70% compared to only 40.8% for US 






Prior studies analysing cov-lite contracting (e.g., Becker and Ivashina 2016; Berlin et al. 2020; 
Ivashina and Vallee 2018) suggest that the cov-lite phenomenon is a feature exclusive to the leveraged 
loan market. They associate the rise in cov-lite leveraged loans to the growing participation of mutual 
funds, collaterized loan obligations, and other non-bank institutions in the leveraged loan market. The 
presence of these investors transformed the role of banks as diligent monitors and relationship lenders. 
When institutional investors own a substantial portion of corporate loans, they prefer to remove 
covenants based on periodically reported accounting numbers to avoid verification and enforcement 
costs (Billett et al. 2016). Consistent with this idea, Bozanic, Loumioti and Vasvari (2018) provide 
evidence that the standardization of loan covenants alleviates information-processing costs, which 
facilitates trading; and De Franco, Vasvari, Vyas, and Wittenberg-Moerman (2020) show that 
similarity in bond covenants’ restrictiveness reduces information acquisition and processing costs, 
resulting in lower bond yields at issuance and greater bond market liquidity.5 We extend this line of 
research by studying the effects of cov-lite contracting in the high-yield bond market, where contracts 
are typically riskier and “lighter” than in the syndicated loan market (Begley and Freedman 2004; 
Milbank 2014).  
 
We find that cov-lite high-yield bonds have higher trading, higher turnover and lower yields in the 
30 days and 90 days after issuance compared to other (non cov-lite) high-yield bonds.  We interpret 
these findings as evidence of growing investor demand for risky debt investments with lower 
verification and enforcement costs. Institutional investors are now the predominant investors in the 
high-yield bond market, motivated by low interest rates and low corporate default rates, large cash 
holdings from record sales of structured investment vehicles (Stein 2013), and unmet demand for 
risky investments (Aneiro 2012; Kosnett 2014; Schwarzberg and Li 2018, Smith 2017a, Smith 
2017b). These investors prefer lighter covenant structures that boost trading and avoid the costs of 
accounting verification and enforcement (Billett et al. 2016; De Franco et al. 2020). At the same time, 
supply of high-yield bonds reduced since the financial crisis, as some high yield issuers have 
upgraded to investment grade and others exchanged bonds for loans (Kosnett 2014; Smith 2017b). 
These demand and supply movements create competition among investors for cov-lite bonds, 
increasing their trading and prices, and thus lowering bond yields.  
 
 
5 Our study differs from De Franco et al. (2020) in at least two major respects: their sample period is 2000 through 2009, 
which predates the most recent increase in issuances of cov-lite high-yield bonds; and they consider a mix of investment 





The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a schematic explanation of the 
covenant structure of public bonds and private loans. Section 3 explains the demand for cov-lite 
contracts and develops our hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and sample, section 5 presents 
the model and variables, and section 6 discusses descriptive results. The results of regression tests are 
reported in section 7. Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2. Changing Debt Markets 
 
Historically, loans differed substantially from bonds. Loans were illiquid and held by banks which 
periodically monitored borrowers, whereas bonds were liquid and only reassessed if an incurrence 
event such as a merger and acquisition arose. Only the most credit worthy public (i.e., investment 
grade) companies would issue bonds (see for example De Fontenay 2014 for a detailed explanation 
of bonds versus loans). 
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With the introduction of high-yield bonds in the 1980s: 
 
 


















And the introduction of securitized leveraged loans: 
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More recently, with the introduction of cov-lite bonds and cov-lite loans, the distinctions have 
changed again. Initially cov-lite high-yield bonds differed from other (regular) high-yield bonds by 





high-yield bonds and at the same time, cov-lite high-yield bonds were issued with a reduced set of 
incurrence covenants. During our sample period, the principal distinction between cov-lite and other 
high-yield bonds is that the cov-lite bonds have fewer incurrence covenants, and the excluded 
covenants are typically accounting-related. At the end of Section 4, we detail how we operationalize 
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Our focus is on the high-yield bond market, where we compare trading, turnover, and yields of cov-
lite high-yield bonds with those of other high-yield bonds.  
 
3. The Demand for Cov-Lite Bonds and Development of Hypotheses 
  
 
Before presenting our hypotheses, we review the literature that provides insights into why there has 
been a dramatic rise in cov-lite bond contracting. Ayotte and Bolton (2011) build a theory to explain 
that when good states are expected in the future with high probability, investors will rationally forego 
the use of contractual covenants that require verification of the borrower’s situation if, in return, 
liquidity and simplicity are sufficiently enhanced. In the Ayotte and Bolton (2011) model, 
standardization of contracts enhances liquidity as long as these contracts provide sufficient 
information for investors to participate in the deal. The borrower has incentives to include contractual 
terms that generate screening costs. The standardization of contracts can reduce screening costs in 
two ways: (i) it becomes cheaper for the borrower to disclose certain (but not all) information about 
the borrower’s condition; and (ii) it becomes easier for the investor to anticipate which claims other 
potential investors will be offered in exchange for carry-on funding. If the information reveals enough 
about the state of the borrower, the investor is willing to participate in the deal without further 
screening. However, if the investor’s rational expectation is that the borrower will reveal only 
information that is favorable to the borrower, the investor will not be willing to trade and will demand 






Two possible solutions emerge. In the first, contracts become covenant-lite and trading increases 
because of reduced screening costs. In this respect, Bozanic et al. (2018) provide empirical evidence 
that collaterized loan obligations which are investments in a basket of high-yield loans rely on the 
simplification of covenants as a mechanism to lower their screening costs. They show that covenant 
simplification is associated with fewer covenants and higher loan turnover. Similarly, De Franco et 
al. (2020) show that the more similar the restrictiveness of bond covenants the lower the information 
acquisition and processing costs, leading to lower yields at issuance.  
 
These studies stress the existence of a trade-off between the potential control benefits of tailored 
(restrictive) covenants and the reduced contracting costs associated with standardized (similar) 
covenant packages. Cov-lite contracts fail to limit excess borrowing and hence they are more likely 
when investors are more concerned about avoiding monitoring costs than about reducing agency costs 
of debt. This trade-off is more likely to occur when the probability of corporate default is low, 
borrowers’ financing needs are high, and the depth of liquidity in the market is great. In these 
conditions, it is less costly to give up covenant enforcement in exchange for lower screening costs 
because investors can easily sell if the borrower’s performance deteriorates. High-yield bondholders 
also have incentives to prefer cov-lite bonds because covenant enforcement would result in lower 
verification and coordination costs. Unlike private lenders, individual bondholders face a substantial 
collective action problem resulting from the lack of legal and financial incentives to enforce violations 
of covenants (Kahan and Rock 2009). If these screening and coordination arguments are correct, we 
expect higher flows towards cov-lite contracts to be reflected in higher trading and turnover: 
 
H1a: High-yield bonds with cov-lite structures have greater trading volume/turnover relative to 
other high-yield bonds. 
 
Alternatively, if the investor believes that all of the unobserved terms in the standardized contract are 
unfavorable to her, the trading occurs less frequently. Anticipating investors’ beliefs, the borrower 
writes a contract with covenant features to signal high creditworthiness. In this case, investors are 
more concerned about restricting excessive borrowing if the borrower’s performance deteriorates than 
about reducing verification costs. They particularly welcome covenants that limit additional 
borrowing and cash distributions to shareholders and third parties, and thus would prefer high-yield 
bonds that require accounting verification for these actions to occur. These accounting-based 





wealth in favor of shareholders after the debt issuance. In this scenario, we do not expect cov-lite 
contracts to have higher trading and turnover: 
 
H1b: High-yield bonds with cov-lite structure do not have greater trading volume/turnover 
relative to other high-yield bonds. 
 
Hypothesis 2 addresses the effect of cov-liteness on bond yields. Cov-liteness can potentially lead to 
higher yields for several reasons. The first is the rise in demand for risky assets by non-bank investors 
such as insurance companies. In good economic times, characterized by a low probability of corporate 
default and low interest rates, reaching for yield becomes more attractive (Becker and Ivashina 2015; 
Rajan 2005). Because reaching for yield is associated with higher risk-taking, investors may take on 
riskier (i.e., cov-lite) bonds. Second, an increase in yields may come from the supply side (i.e., 
borrowers offering an initial price discount). The decision about covenants is jointly determined with 
the pricing of the contract (Bradley and Roberts 2015). In making that decision, the borrower may 
trade off an increase in the cost of debt for the benefits of minimal financial restrictions. The borrower 
would then offer an initial discount to counterbalance the effect of cov-lite contracting. Further, more 
competition for funds among borrowers can force companies to lower their offering price to ensure 
the necessary funds.6 If cov-lite provisions reflect borrowers’ pricing decisions or investors reaching 
for yields, then: 
 
H2a: Cov-lite high-yield bonds have higher yields than other high-yield bonds 
 
However, recent evidence in Becker and Ivashina (2016) for leveraged loans offers an alternative 
explanation for the relation between cov-lite contracting and yields. They show that while cov-lite 
loan trading expanded, cov-lite loan yields declined, which is inconsistent with the reaching for yield 
argument. Declining yields in leveraged loans are associated with increased participation of 
institutional investors in high-risk debt markets and their preference for investments with low 
screening and creditor-coordination costs (Becker and Ivashina 2016; Ivashina and Sun 2011). Non-
bank investors do not benefit from relationship rents that can partially compensate for the cost of 
verification and enforcing contract provisions (Billet et al. 2016). In this scenario, contract provisions 
that require accounting verification become inefficient (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996;  Gertner and 
 
6 Borrower competition for funds reflects several factors. One is the large number of firms seeking refinancing of pre-
crisis loans, including European firms entering U.S. bond markets where the economic recovery started earlier 
(Billington, Piscicelli and Boury, 2015). Another factor is borrowers trying to lock in the low interest rates that are 





Scharfstein 1991; Van den Steen 2010). In the bond market, De Franco et al. (2020) observe that the 
increase in demand for covenant similarity by insurance investors result in lower yields at issuance. 
The simplification of bond covenants allows these institutional investors to more quickly assess the 
risks of contracts due to fewer information-processing costs and more familiarity with contract terms. 
 
Like the leveraged loan market, the high-yield bond market is now dominated by institutional 
investors. The increased demand by these investors for bonds at the high-risk corner of the market 
(cov-lite high-yield) is motivated by low interest rates in other markets, large cash holdings from 
sales of structured investment vehicles (Stein 2013), and unmet demand in the leveraged loan market 
(Aneiro 2012; Kosnett 2014; Schwarzberg and Li 2018, Smith 2017b). Moreover, institutional 
herding is strong particularly in the junk bond market, which further increases competition for high-
yield bonds with light covenant structures (Cai, Song, and Li 2012). As explained by a Moody's 
Senior Covenant Officer: "Amid historically low interest rates, investors have become more 
concerned about being shut out of a bond offering than about poor protections. As issuers continue 
to sell bonds with weak covenant structures, the market is seeing a 'race to the bottom' as underwriters 
compete for issuers' business" (Friedman, 2015). 
 
On the supply side, many borrowers left the high-yield market, some upgrading to investment grade 
and others looking for bond-to-loan refinancing amid low default rates (Kosnett 2014; Smith 2017b), 
resulting in less high-yield bond supply. These demand and supply movements create competition 
among investors and lower expected bond yields (Ivashina and Sun 2011). Because of this we can 
observe lower yields for cov-lite high-yield bonds vis-à-vis other high-yield bonds:  
 
H2b: Yields of high-yield cov-lite bonds are lower than yields of other high-yield bonds 
 
 
4. Data and sample description 
To obtain our data set of U.S. high-yield bonds, we combine multiple sources of data from 2002 
through 2014. Bond issuance data is from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
through TRACE, Mergent FISD, and Xtract Research. More specifically, bond trading information 
such as volume, number of trades, and yield is obtained from TRACE. Bond characteristics such as 
offering amount, maturity, issue date, and maturity date are from Mergent.  Treasury bond yields are 





information from Compustat in the fiscal year immediately before the issuance date. We match with 
Compustat using available company identifiers, such as Cusip and Gvkey, and we manually match 
by borrower name when identifiers are not available. For each bond issue, we require non-missing 
information on issue date, issuing amount, and covenants. This process generates 2,484 high-yield 
bonds issued by 543 firms from 2002 through 2014.  
High-yield cov-lite bonds are high-yield bonds issued by below investment grade borrowers, with 
covenant packages that lack most of the accounting-based incurrence covenants typically found in 
high-yield bonds. To identify the typical accounting-based incurrence covenants missing in high-
yield cov-lite contracts, we use the Xtract classification of cov-lite contracts. Moody’s uses a similar 
classification to assess covenant liteness.7 Cov-lite bonds generally lack restrictions on issuing 
unsecured debt, dividend payments, asset sales, engaging in acquisitions and affiliate-related 
transactions, and the verification of accounting tests at issuance and at incurrence events.8 For 
example, the merger and sale of assets covenant does not require the leverage incurrence test. We 
provide examples of cov-lite and non cov-lite issues in Appendix 1.  
We combine data from Mergent and Xtract to identify the basket of covenants for each bond, and 
then identify whether or not each of the covenant provisions described above is in place. Specifically, 
we identify 12 types of covenants in Mergent that match the definitions of Xtract cov-lite contracts. 
We consider a bond as cov-lite if the contract lacks at 8 eight of these 12 covenants.9  
 
5. Empirical models and variables 
We use a cross-section of high-yield bonds to examine the short-term effects of cov-liteness on 
trading volume, turnover and yield spreads. We perform bond-level tests and firm-level tests for three 
 
7 According to Xtract (https://www.xtractresearch.com/pre/), the covenants that are commonly omitted in cov-lite high-
yield bonds are: indebtedness, restricted payments, dividends restrictions, asset sales restrictions, restrictions on 
transactions with affiliates, no liens, no subordinated debt issues, no fixed charge coverage, no net earnings test issuance, 
no leverage test issuance, no net worth issuance, and merger restrictions. Moody’s uses a similar assessment of covenant 
liteness. They consider the lack of key covenants, namely provisions for restricted payments, change of control, 
limitations on debt incurrence, negative pledges, and merger restrictions (Moody’s 2020). 
8 Although the change of control covenant is designed to benefit high-yield bond investors, the “double trigger” provision 
in high-yield cov-lite bonds voids the put option unless the change of control is accompanied by a ratings downgrade, 
i.e., loosening the creditor’s protection.  
9 In a subsequent analysis in section 7, we test alternative definitions of cov-lite contracts. Specifically, we use: (i) a more 
restrictive criterion by imposing that a cov-lite bond contract must omit at least 10 of the 12 cov-lite covenants identified 
by Xtract; and (ii) a continuous cov-lite variable equal to the natural logarithm of the number of cov-lite covenants missing 





alternative dependent variables: Trading volume, Turnover and Yield spread calculated for each bond 
over a 30-day and a 90-day window following the bond issuance.   
For the bond level tests, we regress the three alternative dependent variables for bond j at time t + 30 
days (and time t + 90 days), where t is the issue date, on a cov-lite indicator. We control for a set of 
bond and market characteristics and include industry and year fixed effects. The model is as follows: 
Volume/Turnover/Yieldj, t+30/90days = β0+β1COVLITEj,t+βkXj,t+Year/IndustryFE +εj,t (1) 
Trading volume is the natural log of the sum of daily trading volumes over 30 days, or 90 days, 
following the bond issuance date, divided by the issuance size. Turnover is the daily trading volume 
relative to the bond issuance size, averaged across 30 (90) days after the issuance day. Yield spread 
is the median daily yield over the 30 (90) days from the bond issuance date minus the maturity-
matched Treasury bond yield. We use the natural log of the yield spread in all regressions.  
We include bond-level and market-level control variables (Xj,t) widely used in the literature (e.g., 
Ball, Xi, and Shivakumar 2015; Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan 2011; Bharath, Sunder 
and Sunder 2008; Florou and Kosi 2015). In particular, we include Maturity defined as the bond’s 
time to maturity in years, Issuance calculated as the natural log of the bond’s par value, and the 
Number of trades calculated as the bond’s average number of daily trades over 30 (90) days following 
the issuance date. For each bond, we also measure the sensitivity to stock and bond market conditions 
by regressing weekly bond returns on weekly returns on the CRSP value-weighted index and on the 
Barclays US bond index to obtain stock and bond betas, respectively.  
We capture market-wide conditions with two measures: the Barclays US Corporate Bond Index (Bond 
market index), measured as the weekly average returns over 30 (90) days  following the individual 
bond issuance date; and the Chicago Board Options Exchange Nasdaq Volatility Index (CBOE VXN), 
which reflects the overall market uncertainty and risk (referred to as the “fear gauge” of the market), 
calculated over 30 (90) days after bond issuance.  
The bond-level model ignores borrower characteristics such as creditworthiness and financial 
performance that are likely to influence the decision to issue a cov-lite bond. Typically, firms with 
better credit quality are more likely to issue cov-lite contracts relatively to those with worse credit 
quality because investors are less concerned about contractual terms that impose discipline when 
there is less likelihood of borrower default. Hence, observed trading and yield effects may be driven 
by unobserved risk and other characteristics of the issuer. To address this concern, we employ an 





choice and the second-stage equation regresses trading volume, turnover, and yield spreads on cov-
lite and control variables. The model is as follows: 
Volume/Turnover/Yieldj, t+30/90days=β0+β1COVLITEj,t+βkXj,t+Year/Industry FE +εj,t 




The set of Zi,t variables in the first-stage equation represents the incentives of firm i to issue high-
yield bonds with a cov-lite structure. We use the following variables to account for firm risk and 
creditworthiness: market leverage (total debt to market value), stock return volatility (mean standard 
deviation of monthly returns calculated over the 12 months before issuance), issuer rating quality 
(issuer rating score ranging from 1 to 7 based on the S&P rating of the issuer, where a higher score 
indicates higher rating quality)10, distance to default calculated using the KMV-Merton model, 
following Bharath and Shumway (2008). We add firm size (natural log of total assets), return on 
assets (earnings before interest and taxes to total assets), and the S&P index of stock returns (average 
monthly returns 12 months prior to the bond issuance) to control for overall market conditions. We 
also include year and industry fixed effects (based on five industry groups).11 
 
6. Descriptive and univariate results 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for bond and market characteristics (Panel A) and issuer 
characteristics (Panel B). The high-yield bonds in our sample are large with a mean (median) issuance 
amount of $510 ($361) million and an average maturity of close to nine years. The average trading 
volume during the first 30 (90) days after the bond issue date is around 20 (57) times the bond issuance 
amount, whereas the total trading volume in the first 30 (90) days from the issue is around $7.9 ($22.1) 
billion.12 The average daily turnover is 1.97 (1.94) times the bond issuance size, whereas the average 
daily number of trades is 6.7 (5.9) over the 30 (90) days after the bond issuance. On average, the 
 
10 We convert the S&P credit rating system into the following scores: 1 for ratings below CCC+, 2 for ratings between 
B- and B+, 3 for ratings between BB- and BB+, 4 for ratings between BBB- and BBB+, 5 for ratings between A- and 
A+, 6 for ratings between AA- and AA+, and 7 for ratings above AA+. 
11 The five industry groups are as follows: industry 1 includes SIC codes 0 and 1 representing agriculture, mining and 
construction; industry 2 includes SIC codes 2, 3 and 4 representing manufacturing, transportation and communications; 
industry 3 is for SIC code 5 representing wholesale and retail trade; industry 4 includes SIC codes 6 and 7 representing 
finance and services; and industry 5 includes SIC codes 8 and 9 representing education and public administration. 





sample firms have total assets worth $8.4 million, a return on assets of 1.5%, and a market leverage 
of 1.93.  
Table 1 here 
 
In Table 2, we compare high-yield cov-lite bonds with other high-yield bonds. Cov-lite bonds 
experience higher trading relative to non cov-lite bonds across a number of indicators. The average 
trading volume for cov-lite bonds is 25.6 (68.2) times the issuance size in the first 30 (90) days after 
the issuance date, whereas the corresponding figures for non cov-lite bonds are 18.3 (51.9) for the 
first 30 (90) days of trading. In the first 30 days of trading, high-yield cov-lite bonds have 11% more 
daily turnover than other high-yields bonds (2.1 for cov-lite and 1.9 for other high-yield), and have 
twice the average number of trades (10.1 for cov-lite and 5.1 for other high-yield). These differences 
are both economically and statistically significant.  
Table 2 here 
The results in Table 2 suggest lower average yield spreads for cov-lite bonds compared to other high-
yield bonds. For the 30-days period, the mean yield spreads are 2.81 percent (281 basis points) for 
cov-lite high-yield bonds and 4.53 percent (453 basis points) for other high-yields. This lower yield 
spreads suggest that cov-liteness in the high-yield market is associated with investors’ preference for 
instruments with low verification costs rather than with borrowers’ pricing decisions. Cov-lite issues 
have a longer maturity (11 years compared to 8 years for other high-yield bonds), and their mean size 
is larger ($563 million compared to $486 million for other high-yield bonds). Although the evidence 
in Table 2 is consistent with enhanced trading and lower yields for high-yield cov-lite bonds, we are 
careful not to draw strong inferences from the univariate analyses because they do not control for 
differences in borrower and bond characteristics. With respect to the individual bond’s sensitivities 
to the overall corporate bond and stock market conditions, we find that cov-lite high-yield bonds are 
significantly more sensitive to the conditions in the aggregate stock market (Beta stock) relative to 
other high-yield bonds but they are not more sensitive to conditions in the bond market (Beta bond). 
On average, cov-lite borrowers are larger, less profitable, and have a better long-term credit rating.  
Figure 1 plots the issue amount (Panel A) and frequency (Panel B) of cov-lite bonds and other high-
yield bonds, issued from 2005 through 2014 for our sample cases. The number of cov-lite bonds 
increased until the financial crisis, decreased in 2008, and increased again after the crisis. In monetary 





almost all the sample years, particularly in 2009 where the debt value of cov-lite issues exceeded 
$700 million USD. 
Figure 1 here 
In Table 3 and Figure 2, we compare trading volume, turnover, and yield spread in the 30-day window 
after the issue of high-yield cov-lite bonds with that of other high-yield bonds, by year. The average 
trading volume in the first 30 days of trading is significantly greater for high-yield cov-lite bonds than 
for other high-yield bonds in every year (Figure 2, Panel A). Prior to 2007, the volume trends of the 
two groups are roughly comparable. From 2007 onward, the trends diverge. In 2008, the average 
trading volume in the first month after issuance increases sharply for cov-lite but declines for other 
bonds. The pattern reverses for bonds issued in 2009: the trading volume drops for cov-lite but rises 
for other bonds. In subsequent years, the trading volume of cov-lite bonds is more unstable than that 
of other bonds. The financial crisis had a strong effect on cov-lite bonds. The average turnover is 
similar for the two types of bonds in most years, except during the crisis years where turnover of cov-
lite bonds jumped and reached a peak (Figure 2, Panel B). Cov-lite bonds have consistently lower 
yields than other bonds in all sample years and for the 30-day and 60-day windows (Figure 2, Panel 
C and Table 3). This evidence is in line with hypotheses 2a, that there is a preference for covenant 
simplicity by investors and borrowers resulting in higher trading and lower yields. 
Table 3 here 
Figure 2 here 
Table 4 reports Pearson correlations. For simplicity, we report only bond variables measured in the 
30-day window following bond issuance. The cov-lite indicator is positively correlated with Trading 
volume and Turnover, and negatively correlated with Yield spread. Cov-lite is also positively 
correlatedwith firm Size and bond Maturity, and negatively correlated with the Issuer rating score. 
Table 4 here 
7. Regression results 
We use bond-level regression analysis to examine the cross-sectional association between cov-
liteness and bond characteristics (trading volume, turnover, and yield). Table 5 presents results for 
the 30-day and 90-day window after the bond issuance date. In columns (1) and (4), we document a 
strong positive relation between COV-LITE and trading volume. The coefficient on COV-LITE is 





The result is economically significant and indicates that, relative to other high-yield bonds, the trading 
volume of cov-lite bonds is on average 25% higher.13  Columns (2) and (5) report similar results for 
Turnover. The average daily turnover for cov-lite high-yield bonds over the first 30 days following 
issuance is 0.26 higher than that for other high-yield bonds. This result represents about 16% of the 
standard deviation of the 30-day bond turnover. Overall, the empirical findings in Table 5 support 
hypothesis H1a, that high-yield bonds with cov-lite features have greater trading volume and turnover 
than other high-yield bonds. The results suggest that cov-lite structures facilitate bond trading. Results 
in columns (3) and (6) show a strong and negative association between COV-LITE and the log yield 
spread, for both the 30-day and 90-day periods. A cov-lite high-yield bond has an average 30-day 
yield spread of about 50% lower than that of other high-yield bonds, which is an economically 
meaningful result.14 These effects remain if we extend the window to 60 days after the bond 
issuance.15 The lower yield of bonds with cov-lite features is consistent with hypothesis H2b and with 
findings in Becker and Ivashina (2016) and De Franco et al. (2020), suggesting that strong investor 
demand for risky assets with minimum verification and enforcement costs keeps yield down but 
increases trading.  
Table 5 here 
Regarding other bond characteristics, the results indicate that high-yield bonds with longer maturity 
have lower yield spreads but greater trading volume. Large issuances experience less trading and 
turnover, consistent with prior findings that large issuances are more illiquid (McGinty 2001). The 
number of trades of high-yield bonds is inversely related with trading volume and turnover. In other 
words, more trades do not imply more volume and turnover, particularly if trades are small in size 
(Bao, Pan and Wang 2011). We find that the bond’s sensitivity to the bond market conditions, 
measured by beta stock, matters for trading and turnover, i.e., relatively riskier bonds have lower 
trading and turnover. Market uncertainty, captured by the CBOE volatility index, is negatively 
associated with bond trading and turnover, and positively associated with yield spreads.  
Our next analysis, addresses the concern that unobserved borrower-specific characteristics may 
influence both the decision to issue a cov-lite bond and the market performance of the bond. The 
unobserved conditions are a potential source of endogeneity. If there are other issuer-level factors 
 
13 The average trading volume (the sum of daily trading volumes over 30 days divided by the issuance size) for other 
high-yield bonds is 18.31, and the average trading volume for cov-lite high-yield bonds would be e(ln(18.31)+0.22) which is 
equal to 22.82. Thus, the trading volume is 25% higher ((22.82-18.31)/18.31) for the cov-lite sample.  
14 With the average 30-day yield spread for other high-yield bonds of 4.53, the corresponding figure for cov-lite sample 
would be 2.28 (e(ln(4.53)-0.69)).  





that explain both the issuance of cov-lite bonds and the market outcomes of the bond, then the 
regression coefficients presented in Table 5 may be biased. For example, a borrower with high credit 
quality may be more inclined to issue cov-lite bonds compared to one with low credit quality because 
investors are less concerned about contractual terms that impose discipline when the borrower’s 
default is less likely. Hence, larger trading and turnover and lower yield spreads observed for cov-lite 
high-yield bonds may be the result of COV-LITE proxying for the higher credit quality of the bond 
issuer rather than indicating the incremental benefits of cov-lite contracting. To address this concern, 
we employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach and use several issuer characteristics to instrument 
for cov-liteness, including proxies for creditworthiness and risk. The practical disadvantage of this 
approach is the reduction in sample size due to the matching of bond and firm data.  
Table 6 reports the results of the first-stage equation of model 2.16 Larger, less profitable, and more 
leveraged borrowers issue more cov-lite high-yield bonds. Cov-lite contracts are also more likely 
when equity risk is high (stock return volatility) and when the company has a relatively good credit 
rating. The F-statistic for the joint significance of the coefficients on the instruments listed at the 
bottom of Table 6 is significant and above the recommended threshold of 10 to be considered reliable 
(Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002).17 
Table 6 here 
In Table 7, we present the estimation results of the second-stage regression of market outcomes on 
COV-LITE. The key result is the significant increase in trading volume and turnover and the 
significant reduction in (log) yield spreads for cov-lite high-yield bonds relative to other high-yield 
bonds. These results are consistent for the 30-day and 90-day windows and confirm our hypotheses 
H1a and H2b.  
Table 7 here 
 
Compared to other high-yield bonds, cov-lite high-yield bonds experience 56% (33%) larger trading 
volume in the first 30 days (90 days), and 0.44 (0.43) points higher turnover in the first 30 days (90 
days). These results are statistically and economically significant and even stronger than those 
 
16 Note that the first-stage equation estimating the likelihood of cov-lite issuance is the same for all three outcome 
variables in the second stage.  
17 Ideally, we would have liked to confirm whether demand for cov-lite decreases when certain institutional bond 
investors hold a greater share of the bonds, but we have no access to time-series information on bond holdings. As an 
alternative, we use the proportion of shares owned by equity institutional investors. Our results are virtually the same 
but our sample size is much smaller. We acknowledge that holdings of equity investors may not be a good proxy for 





reported for the OLS regression in Table 5. For example, the 30-day (90-day) turnover for cov-lite 
bonds represents 27% (28%) of its cross-sectional standard deviation. We also confirm our prior 
results that yield spreads are lower for cov-lite bonds compared with those of other high-yield bonds. 
The 30 days (90 days) yield spread is about 34% (30%) lower for cov-lite bonds relative to other 
high-yields.18  
 
Our findings suggest that investors in risky bonds trade off investor protection provided by covenants 
for easier trading. A preference for lighter covenant structures, which reduce verification costs and 
enhance trading, is also observed in leveraged loans by Becker and Ivashina (2016) and in investment 
grade bonds by De Franco et al. (2020).19 In the risky environment of high-yield bonds, waiving 
accounting terms to verify incurrence of events implies a potentially large protection deficiency. 
 
 
To confirm our results, we conduct several additional analyses. In Table 8, we conduct our tests using 
a propensity score matched sample of firms. We match cov-lite issuers with other issuers with similar 
firm and market characteristics (size, return on assets, leverage, stock return volatility, issuer rating 
quality, distance to default, S&P stock returns).20 The empirical results are similar to those presented 
in Table 7. We observe that cov-lite bonds have significantly higher trading and turnover and lower 
yield spreads than other high-yield bonds.  
Table 8 here 
Next, we repeat the tests using only the periods in which the likelihood of credit default is relatively 
low, i.e., excluding 2008, 2009 and 2010, which are not classified as low bond default years by S&P. 
Our empirical tests include year fixed effects, which should minimize time-specific events such as 
the financial crisis. However, it is possible that time fixed effects do not fully account for the high 
prevalence of credit defaults during the crisis years. Our findings (reported in Table 9, Panel A) do 
not change, suggesting that the peaks in cov-lite trading observed around the financial crisis (see 
figure 2) do not drive our results. 
Table 9 here 
 
18 In untabulated regression results, we consider firms that issued both cov-lite and non cov-lite bonds during our 
sample period. We find no significant differences between these firms and firms that issue only one type of high-yield 
bonds. 
19 De Franco et al. (2020) analyze a sample of mixed US bonds where more than 80% are investment grade bonds. 
20 We conduct propensity score matching (PSM) using nearest neighbor with replacement and common support. The 
caliper distance is set to 0.25 standard deviations from the propensity score. We repeat the PSM with other 





Finally, we re-define our cov-lite variable as a continuous variable equal to the natural logarithm of 
the number of cov-lite covenants missing in the contract. This procedure avoids making assumptions 
about the number of missing covenants above which a contract is considered cov-lite. The results 
reported in Table 9, Panel B, confirm the results in Table 7. 
8. Conclusion  
In recent years, a growing number of high-yield bonds have been issued with a restricted set of 
incurrence covenants that were traditionally written on accounting variables. These cov-lite contracts 
show how public debt contract design needs to balance two conflicting forces – increasing covenants 
protection but, at the same time, impairing ease of trading.  We observe the trading, turnover, and 
yield spreads of cov-lite high-yield bonds vis-à-vis other high-yield bonds during the short-window 
(30 days and 60 days) after bond issuance. We find that cov-lite bonds have higher trading and 
turnover and lower yields. Our findings suggest that strong demand for investments at the high-risk 
corner of the public debt market by investors that prefer contracts with minimum verification costs 
resulted in easier trading and kept bond yield expectations low.  
Our study provides insights into the fundamental role of accounting as an efficient mechanism in 
public debt contracting design. We show that there are economic scenarios in which demand for using 
periodic accounting reporting for contracting is limited even in a risky environment. We provide 
empirical support for the hypothesis that when the probability of corporate default is low, bond 
investors are prepared to drop investor protection provided by covenants written on accounting in 
return for contractual simplicity because this results in greater ease of trading. Our findings enhance 





Appendix 1 - Examples of High-yield Bond Issues 
Cov-lite high-yield (from Xtract Research) 
Tesoro Corporation 
In March 2014, Tesoro issued 5.125% Senior Unsecured Notes due 2024 (rating BB+/Ba2), which, 
in addition to the presence of upstream guarantees, contain a typical investment grade covenant 
package, including: a liens covenant that extends only to principal properties, no restriction on 
debt/equity of subsidiaries, and a change of control put but conditioned upon a rating’s decline. While 
Tesoro has investment grade ratings on its secured bank debt, its issuer level/corporate family ratings 
are below investment grade (BB+/Ba1). 
Forest Laboratories 
Forest Labs issued two series of senior unsecured notes in January 2014, 4.375% Senior Unsecured 
Notes due 2019 and 4.875% Senior Unsecured Notes due 2021 (both rating BB+/Ba1), with the same 
covenant package. Each of these issues include an investment grade style covenant package 
including: lack of upstream guarantees, no dividend and payment restrictions, several significant 
exceptions to subsidiary indebtedness. The issuer level/corporate family ratings are BB+/Ba1. 
KB Homes  
KB Homes issued 4.75% Senior Unsecured Notes due 2019 in March 2014 (rating B/B2), which are 
supported by upstream guarantees but otherwise contain provisions expected to be found in an 
investment grade deal. Restrictions on secured debt, sale and leaseback, mergers, consolidations and 
transfers of substantially all of the assets are subject to a large number of important exceptions and 
limitations. There is no change of control put. Lack of restrictions on dividend payments, issuing, or 
repurchasing securities. The issuer level rating is B/B2 and it does not have any debt rated investment 
grade. 
 
Other (non cov-lite) high-yield 
AMC Networks 
In December 2012, AMC Networks issued $600,000,000 principal amount of 4.75% senior notes due 
December 15, 2022 (rating BB-/B1). The notes have the usual high yield provisions, specifically 
limitations on indebtedness for both unsecured and secured debt, restricted payments, no permission 
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Issues of cov-lite high-yield bonds and other high-yield bonds 
Panel A: Issue amount (thousand USD)  
 
 
Panel B: Frequency of issues 
 
This figure plots the par value of debt issued (Panel A) and number of issues (Panel B) for cov-lite high-yield bonds and 











































Trading, Turnover and Yield in the 30-day Window After Bond Issuance 
Panel A: Trading Volume 30 days after issuance 
 
Panel B: Turnover 30 days after issuance 
 
Panel C: Yield spread 30 days after issuance 
 
This figure plots average Trading volume (Panel A), Turnover (Panel B) and Yield spread (Panel C) following the bond 






Summary Statistics of Bond, Market and Firm Variables 
This Table reports summary statistics for the pooled sample. Panel A reports statistics for bond and market variables. Panel B reports 
statistics for firm variables.  Total trading volume is the sum of daily trading volumes over 30 and 90 days following the bond issuance 
date. Trading volume is the sum of daily trading volumes over 30 and 90 days following the bond issuance date divided by the issuance 
size. Turnover is the daily trading volume relative to the bond issuance size, averaged across 30 and 90 days from the day of the bond 
issuance. Yield spread is measured as the median daily yield over 30 (90) days from the bond issuance date minus maturity matched 
Treasury bond yield. Maturity is the bond’s time to maturity in years. Issuance amount is the bond’s par value of the amount issued. 
Beta stock and Beta bond are obtained by regressing weekly bond returns on weekly returns on the CRSP value-weighted index and 
on the Barclays US bond index. Number of trades is the bond’s mean number of daily trades over 30 and 90 days following the issuance 
date. Bond market index is the weekly return on the Barclays US Corporate Bond Index averaged over 30 and 90 days following the 
individual bond issue date and CBOE index index is the Chicago Board Options Nasdaq Volatility Index captured from the pricing of 
the S&P 500 options index. S&P500 stock index is the stock returns of the S&P500 index calculated as the average monthly returns 
over 12 months prior to bond issuance. Size is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. Market leverage is total debt to market value of 
the firm. ROA is EBIT to total assets. Return volatility is the mean standard deviation of monthly stock returns calculated over 12 
months before bond issuance. Issuer rating quality is the firm rating score ranging from 1 to 7 based on S&P long-term rating of the 
issuer, where a higher score indicates higher rating quality. Distance to default is calculated using the KMV-Merton model (Bharath 
and Shumway 2008).  
 
Panel A: Bond and market characteristics (N=2,484) Mean Median SD 
Bond characteristics    
Total trading volume in million USD (30 days) 7 927 065 7 402 500 5 081 663 
Total trading volume in million USD (90 days) 22 100 000 21 300 000 11 900 000 
Trading volume (30 days) 20.577 16.424 16.550 
Trading volume (90 days) 57.020 48.104 47.376 
Turnover (30 days) 1.975 1.487 1.601 
Turnover (90 days) 1.943 1.512 1.508 
Yield spread (30 days) 3.991 3.802 1.947 
Yield spread (90 days) 4.004 3.822 1.970 
Maturity (years) 8.736 7.714 4.988 
Issuance (thousands USD) 510 083 361 277 469 087 
Beta stock 0.289 0.240 1.201 
Beta bond 0.386 0.047 26.151 
Number of trades (30 days) 6.728 3.414 13.881 
Number of trades (90 days) 5.994 3.413 10.603 
Market characteristics    
Bond market index 104.488 104.424 3.161 
CBOE Volatility 20.735 18.617 6.355 
S&P stock returns 0.009 0.011 0.012 
  
Panel B: Firm characteristics (N=800) Mean Median SD 
Size 7.725 7.773 1.208 
ROA 0.015 0.025 0.074 
Market leverage 1.930 1.161 3.573 
Return volatility 0.128 0.107 0.086 
Issuer rating quality 2.149 2.000 0.657 







Summary Statistics for high-yield cov-lite bonds and other high-yield bonds 
This Table compares statistics for high-yield cov-lite bonds with other high-yield bonds. Trading volume is the sum of daily trading 
volumes over 30 and 90 days following the bond issuance date divided by the issuance size. Turnover is the daily trading volume 
relative to the bond issuance size, averaged across 30 and 90 days from the day of the bond issuance. Yield spread is measured as the 
median daily yield over 30 (90) days from the bond issuance date minus maturity matched Treasury bond yield. Issuance amount is 
the bond’s par value of the amount issued. Beta stock and Beta bond are obtained by regressing weekly bond returns on weekly returns 
on the CRSP value-weighted index and on the Barclays US bond index. Number of trades is the bond’s mean number of daily trades 
over 30 and 90 days following the issuance date. Size is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. ROA is EBIT to total assets. Market 
leverage is total debt to market value of the firm. Return volatility is the mean standard deviation of monthly stock returns calculated 
over 12 months before bond issuance. Issuer rating quality is the firm rating score ranging from 1 to 7 based on S&P long-term rating 
of the issuer, where a higher score indicates higher rating quality. Distance to default is calculated using the KMV-Merton model 
(Bharath and Shumway 2008). 
 
 
 Cov-lite high-yield bonds  Other high-yield bonds  
Difference 
in means 
 Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD 
 
p-value 
Bond characteristics        
  
Trading volume (30 days) 25.56 18.46 22.56  18.31 15.67 12.29 
 
0.000 
Trading volume (90 days) 68.23 54.08 72.15  51.93 45.98 28.60 
 
0.000 
Turnover (30 days) 2.10 1.43 1.88  1.92 1.51 1.45 
 
0.011 
Turnover (90 days) 2.04 1.45 1.79  1.90 1.52 1.36 
 
0.036 
Yield spread (30 days) 2.82 2.56 1.95  4.53 4.38 1.69  0.000 
Yield spread (90 days) 2.80 2.59 2.01  4.50 4.36 1.69 
 
0.000 
Maturity (years) 10.83 9.00 8.07  7.78 7.60 1.92 
 
0.000 
Issuance amount (thousand USD) 563,179 387,831 584,639  485,960 350,000 403,766 
 
0.000 
Beta stock 0.38 0.25 1.29  0.25 0.23 1.16 
 
0.008 
Beta bond -0.05 0.06 4.45  0.58 0.04 31.40 
 
0.578 
Number of trades (30 days) 10.13 4.58 20.95  5.18 3.00 8.56 
 
0.000 
Number of trades (90 days) 8.36 4.29 16.09  4.92 3.14 6.51 
 
0.000 
Firm characteristics        
  
Size 8.17 8.21 1.14  7.32 7.42 1.12 
 0.000 
ROA 0.01 0.02 0.08  0.02 0.03 0.07 
 0.029 
Market leverage 1.84 1.17 2.89  2.01 1.15 4.09 
 0.487 
Return volatility 0.12 0.10 0.07  0.14 0.11 0.10 
 0.008 
Issuer rating quality 2.24 2.00 0.79  2.06 2.00 0.49 
 0.000 







Trading volume, Turnover and Yield of High-Yield Bonds by Year 
This table reports the number of bond issues and the mean values of Trading volume, Turnover and Yield spreads for high-yield cov-lite bonds and other higher yield bonds, by calendar year. 
Trading volume is the sum of daily trading volumes over 30 and 90 days following the bond issuance date divided by the issuance size. Turnover is the daily trading volume relative to the bond 
issuance size, averaged across 30 and 90 days from the day of the bond issuance. Yield spread is measured as the median daily yield over 30 and 90 days from the bond issuance date minus 
maturity matched Treasury bond yield.   
 
    2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
            
Number of bonds issued 
High-yield cov-lite 69 90 102 33 88 83 47 91 110 63 
Other High-yield 261 170 169 69 88 207 240 181 214 109 
            
Trading volume (30 days) 
High-yield cov-lite 27.85 28.57 26.26 34.97 32.53 24.61 20.46 24.95 20.05 20.13 
Other High-yield 22.72 23.32 19.72 17.53 21.32 18.75 16.52 14.93 14.87 14.45 
            
Trading volume (90 days) 
High-yield cov-lite 84.01 79.00 70.16 77.87 81.92 62.91 50.03 58.40 54.93 50.59 
Other High-yield 68.66 65.63 56.94 51.94 58.39 52.12 43.90 40.24 40.51 41.27 
 
           
Turnover (30 days) 
High-yield cov-lite 3.43 2.68 2.49 3.35 2.19 1.86 1.50 1.70 1.40 1.20 
Other High-yield 2.94 2.64 2.34 2.14 1.77 1.82 1.55 1.24 1.32 1.26 
            
Turnover (90 days) 
High-yield cov-lite 3.31 2.59 2.59 3.23 2.15 1.72 1.43 1.62 1.43 1.08 
Other High-yield 2.99 2.69 2.29 2.11 1.78 1.80 1.49 1.19 1.24 1.26 
 
           
Yield spread (30 days) 
High-yield cov-lite 1.76 1.62 1.85 2.30 4.09 3.73 3.93 3.64 2.75 2.71 
Other High-yield 3.79 3.80 4.00 5.99 5.66 5.11 5.39 4.96 4.24 1.26 
            
Yield spread (90 days) 
High-yield cov-lite 1.85 1.57 1.89 2.72 4.03 3.61 4.07 3.51 2.74 2.68 








This Table reports Pearson correlations. Cov-lite is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the bond contract lacks the 
majority of accounting-based incurrence covenants, and 0 otherwise. Trading volume is the sum of daily trading volumes over 30 
days following the bond issuance date divided by the issuance size. Turnover is the daily trading volume relative to the bond issuance 
size, averaged across 30 days from the day of the bond issuance. Yield spread is measured as the median daily yield over 30 days 
from the bond issuance date minus maturity matched Treasury bond yield.  Issuance amount is the bond’s par value of the amount 
issued. Beta stock and Beta bond are obtained by regressing weekly bond returns on weekly returns on the CRSP value-weighted 
index and on the Barclays US bond index. Number of trades is the bond’s mean number of daily trades over 30 days following the 
issuance date. Bond market index is the weekly return on the Barclays US Corporate Bond Index averaged over 30 days following 
the individual bond issue date. CBOE index is the Chicago Board Options Nasdaq Volatility Index captured from the pricing of the 
S&P 500 index options. Size is the natural log of firm’s total assets. ROA is EBIT to total assets. Market leverage is total debt to 
market value of the firm. Return volatility is the mean standard deviation of monthly returns calculated over 12 months before 
issuance. Issuer rating quality is a rating score ranging from 1 to 7 based on S&P long-term rating of the issuer, where a higher 
score indicates higher rating quality. Distance to default is calculated using the KMV-Merton model (Bharath and Shumway 2008). 
S&P500 stock index is the stock returns of the S&P500 index calculated as the average monthly returns over 12 months prior to 
bond issuance. Correlations are based on 800 observations. The symbol * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) COV-LITE 1         
(2) Trading volume 0.245* 1        
(3) Turnover 0.162* 0.668* 1       
(4) Yield spread -0.459* -0.284* -0.243* 1      
(5) Maturity 0.298* 0.131* 0.156* -0.426* 1     
(6) Issuance amount 0.015 -0.450* -0.726* 0.064 -0.013 1    
(7) Beta stock 0.085* 0.069 0.080* -0.050 -0.020 -0.058 1   
(8) Beta bond 0.018 -0.028 -0.001 -0.095* 0.142* 0.021 -0.527* 1  
(9) Number of trades 0.101* -0.133* -0.252* 0.101* -0.040 0.309* 0.017 -0.004 1 
(10) Bond market index -0.187* -0.178* -0.302* 0.386* -0.241* 0.184* 0.017 -0.060 0.144* 
(11) CBOE index 0.006 0.053 0.048 0.341* -0.062 -0.047 0.044 -0.042 -0.030 
(12) Size 0.350* -0.110* -0.325* -0.328* 0.169* 0.541* -0.091* 0.067 0.196* 
(13) ROA -0.037 0.048 0.059 -0.263* 0.136* -0.019 -0.077* 0.039 -0.133* 
(14) Market leverage -0.025 -0.028 -0.008 0.236* -0.063 0.017 0.088* 0.006 0.049 
(15) Return volatility -0.094* 0.067 0.009 0.247* -0.111* -0.040 0.062 -0.080* 0.018 
(16) Issuer rating quality 0.136* -0.034 -0.069 -0.098* 0.122* 0.096* -0.203* 0.170* -0.023 
(17) Distance to default 0.047 0.098* 0.146* 0.122* -0.002 -0.101* 0.078* 0.023 0.009 
(18) S&P stock returns -0.074* -0.154* -0.122* -0.082* -0.023 0.089* -0.012 -0.016 0.008 
 
    (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(10) Bond market index 1         
(11) CBOE index 0.050 1        
(12) Size -0.034 -0.122* 1       
(13) ROA 0.014 -0.133* 0.228* 1      
(14) Market leverage 0.020 0.073* -0.323* -0.338* 1     
(15) Return volatility 0.150* 0.229* -0.270* -0.177* 0.143* 1    
(16) Issuer rating quality -0.001 -0.058 0.257* 0.122* -0.116* -0.190* 1   
(17) Distance to default -0.157* 0.195* -0.182* -0.260* 0.278* 0.228* -0.102* 1  







Bond-Level Analysis: Trading volume, Turnover and Yield of Cov-lite High-yield Bonds 
This table reports cross-sectional regressions of bond Trading volume, Turnover and Yield spread on a cov-lite indicator, and bond-
level and market-level controls. Trading volume is the log of the sum of daily trading volumes over 30 (90) days following the bond 
issuance date divided by the issuance size. Turnover is the daily trading volume relative to the bond issuance size, averaged across 
30 (90) days from the day of the bond issuance. Yield spread is the log of the yield spread measured as the median daily yield over 
30 (90) days from the bond issuance date minus maturity matched Treasury bond yield. Cov-lite is an indicator variable taking the 
value of one if the bond contract lacks the majority of accounting-based incurrence covenants, and 0 otherwise. Maturity is the 
bond’s time to maturity in years. Issuance amount is the bond’s par value of the amount issued. Beta stock and Beta bond are 
obtained by regressing weekly bond returns on weekly returns on the CRSP value-weighted index and on the Barclays US bond 
index. Number of trades is the bond’s mean number of daily trades over 30 and 90 days following the issuance date. Bond market 
index is the weekly return on the Barclays US Corporate Bond Index averaged over 30 and 90 days following the individual bond 
issue date. CBOE index is the Chicago Board Options Nasdaq Volatility Index captured from the pricing of the S&P 500 index 
options. All regressions include time (calendar year of bond issuance date) fixed effects.  T-statistics clustered at the bond-level are 
reported in brackets. Symbols ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 30 days after bond issuance 












  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
COV-LITE 0.220*** 0.256*** -0.685***  0.179*** 0.230*** -0.808*** 
 (6.262) (3.088) (-17.574) 
 (6.975) (2.926) (-15.881) 
        
Maturity 0.008** 0.009 -0.046***  0.004* 0.005 -0.059*** 
 (2.462) (1.491) (-5.504) 
 (1.719) (0.877) (-5.137) 
        
Issuance -0.368*** -1.542*** 0.041  -0.355*** -1.542*** 0.068 
 (-10.370) (-40.236) (1.225) 
 (-9.744) (-44.067) (1.472) 
        
Beta stock 0.043 0.083*** -0.033  0.025* 0.044* -0.038 
 (1.525) (3.020) (-1.264) 
 (1.824) (1.753) (-1.114) 
        
Beta bond -0.001** -0.002*** 0.000  -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 
 (-2.228) (-3.668) (0.806) 
 (-5.012) (-2.719) (0.474) 
        
Bond market index 0.005 0.009 0.012  -0.004 0.016 0.027** 
 (0.492) (0.651) (1.446) 
 (-0.177) (1.327) (2.239) 
        
CBOE index -0.009*** -0.006* 0.017*** 
 
-0.010*** -0.009*** 0.022*** 
 (-3.690) (-1.719) (6.643) 
 (-3.504) (-2.890) (5.593) 
        
Number trades -0.009*** -0.002 0.005***  -0.014*** -0.002 0.007*** 
 (-4.603) (-0.481) (5.624) 
 (-3.962) (-0.441) (4.525) 
        
Constant 6.366*** 21.150*** -1.375  7.878*** 20.594*** -3.856** 
  (5.499) (13.425) (-1.217)  (3.858) (14.972) (-2.181) 
Observations 2484 2484 2484  2484 2484 2484 
Adj.R-squared 0.215 0.554 0.410  0.292 0.634 0.386 








Firm-Level Analysis: The determinants of Issuing Cov-Lite Bonds 
This table reports results for the first stage equation of the determinants of firms issuing high-yield cov-lite bonds. Cov-lite is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one if the bond contract lacks the majority of accounting-based incurrence covenants, and 0 otherwise. Maturity 
is the bond’s time to maturity in years. Issuance amount is the bond’s par value of the amount issued. Beta stock and Beta bond are 
obtained by regressing weekly bond returns on weekly returns on the CRSP value-weighted index and on the Barclays US bond index. 
Number of trades is the bond’s mean number of daily trades over 30 and 90 days following the issuance date. Bond market index is the 
weekly return on the Barclays US Corporate Bond Index averaged over 30 and 90 days following the individual bond issue date. CBOE 
index is the Chicago Board Options Nasdaq Volatility Index captured from the pricing of the S&P 500 index options. Size is the natural 
log of firm’s total assets. ROA is EBIT to total assets. Market leverage is total debt to market value of the firm. Return volatility is the 
mean standard deviation of monthly returns calculated over 12 months before issuance. Issuer rating quality is a rating score ranging from 
1 to 7 based on S&P long-term rating of the issuer, where a higher score indicates higher rating quality. Distance to default is calculated 
using the KMV-Merton model (Bharath and Shumway 2008). S&P500 stock index is the stock returns of the S&P500 index calculated as 
the average monthly returns over 12 months prior to bond issuance. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Symbols ***,**, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 30 days after bond issuance 90 days after bond issuance 
Maturity 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (6.011) (6.329) 
Issuance amount -0.225*** -0.228*** 
 (-7.100) (-7.254) 
Beta stock 0.040*** 0.041*** 
 (2.717) (2.788) 
Beta bond 0.001 0.000 
 (0.194) (0.067) 
  Bond market index 0.003 0.015 
 (0.257) (1.037) 
CBOE index 0.004 0.008* 
 (0.936) (1.664) 
Number of trades 0.003** 0.003** 
 (2.495) (2.100) 
Size 0.220*** 0.226*** 
 (12.047) (12.607) 
ROA -0.833*** -0.786*** 
 (-3.587) (-3.648) 
Market leverage 0.011** 0.011** 
 (2.243) (2.303) 
Return volatility 0.418* 0.467** 
 (1.886) (2.136) 
Issuer rating quality 0.053** 0.051** 
 (2.111) (2.061) 
Distance to default 0.121 0.113 
 (1.284) (1.239) 
S&P stock returns -0.135 -0.892 
 (-0.060) (-0.417) 
Constant 1.077 -0.414 
  (0.760) (-0.272) 
Observations 800 800 
Adj.R-squared 0.301 0.307 
F-test 11.45*** 12.04*** 







Firm-Level Analysis: Trading volume, Turnover and Yield of Cov-Lite Bonds 
This table reports results for the second stage of an instrumental variables model of bond Trading volume, Turnover and Yield 
spread on a cov-lite indicator and controls. Trading volume, Turnover and Yield spread are measured over 30 days (columns 1-
3) or 90 days (columns 4-6) following the bond issuance date. Trading volume is the log of the sum of daily trading volumes over 
30 (90) days following the bond issuance date divided by the issuance size. Turnover is the daily trading volume relative to the 
bond issuance size, averaged across 30 (90) days from the day of the bond issuance. Yield spread is the log of yield spread 
measured as the median daily yield over 30 (90) days from the bond issuance date minus maturity matched Treasury bond yield. 
Cov-lite is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the bond contract lacks the majority of accounting-based incurrence 
covenants, and 0 otherwise Maturity is the bond’s time to maturity in years. Issuance amount is the bond’s par value of the amount 
issued. Beta stock and Beta bond are obtained by regressing weekly bond returns on weekly returns on the CRSP value-weighted 
index and on the Barclays US bond index. Bond market index is the weekly return on the Barclays US Corporate Bond Index 
averaged over 30 and 90 days following the individual bond issue date. CBOE is the Chicago Board Options Nasdaq Volatility 
Index captured from the pricing of the S&P 500 index options. Number of trades is the bond’s mean number of daily trades over 
30 and 90 days following the issuance date. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Symbols ***,**, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 30 days after bond issuance 
 













 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
COV-LITE 0.445*** 0.441** -0.422***  0.285*** 0.410** -0.360** 
 (3.314) (2.273) (-3.175)  (2.702) (2.519) (-2.088) 
    
    
Maturity 0.006 0.018** -0.056***  0.002 0.012* -0.079*** 
 (1.058) (2.307) (-10.381) 
 (0.509) (1.752) (-11.040) 
        
Issuance amount -0.431*** -1.777*** 0.099**  -0.401*** -1.735*** 0.156*** 
 (-9.528) (-27.162) (2.207)  (-10.999) (-31.074) (2.640) 
    
    
Beta stock 0.015 0.052 -0.089***  0.051** 0.070** -0.104*** 
 (0.582) (1.397) (-3.494) 
 (2.452) (2.219) (-3.103) 
        
Beta bond -0.001 0.005 -0.020*  0.012 0.017 -0.024* 
 (-0.119) (0.351) (-1.950)  (1.469) (1.316) (-1.732) 
    
    
Number of trades -0.013 -0.006 0.023  -0.055*** -0.003 0.023 
 (-0.620) (-0.202) (1.061) 
 (-2.763) (-0.113) (0.820) 
        
Bond market index -0.011 -0.010 0.028***  -0.012* -0.015 0.040*** 
 (-1.587) (-0.973) (4.008) 
 (-1.800) (-1.471) (3.855) 
        
CBOE index -0.005** -0.004 0.001  -0.005** -0.003 -0.000 
 (-2.461) (-1.301) (0.380)  (-2.530) (-1.065) (-0.106) 
        
Constant 9.800*** 25.076*** -4.513*  14.946*** 24.192*** -3.930 
  (4.214) (7.463) (-1.849)  (6.969) (8.536) (-1.268) 
Observations 800 800 800  800 800 800 
Adj.R-squared 0.314 0.598 0.470  0.388 0.664 0.431 







Firm-Level Analysis for Propensity Score Matched Firms 
This table reports results for the regression model of bond Trading volume, Turnover and Yield spread on a cov-lite variable and 
controls, using a propensity score matched sample of cov-lite and non cov-lite firms. Trading volume, Turnover and Yield spread 
are measured over 30 days (columns 1-3) or 90 days (columns 4-6) following the bond issuance date. Trading volume is the log 
of the sum of daily trading volumes over 30 (90) days following the bond issuance date divided by the issuance size. Turnover is 
the daily trading volume relative to the bond issuance size, averaged across 30 (90) days from the day of the bond issuance. Yield 
spread is the log of yield spread measured as the median daily yield over 30 (90) days from the bond issuance date minus maturity 
matched Treasury bond yield. In Panel A, Cov-lite is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the bond contract lacks the 
majority of accounting-based incurrence covenants, and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, Cov-lite is a continuous variable equal to the 
natural logarithm of the number of cov-lite related covenants missing in the contract. Control variables include the following. 
Maturity is the bond’s time to maturity in years. Issuance amount is the bond’s par value of the amount issued. Beta stock and 
Beta bond are obtained by regressing weekly bond returns on weekly returns on the CRSP value-weighted index and on the 
Barclays US bond index. Bond market index is the weekly return on the Barclays US Corporate Bond Index averaged over 30 
and 90 days following the individual bond issue date. CBOE is the Chicago Board Options Nasdaq Volatility Index captured from 
the pricing of the S&P 500 index options. Number of trades is the bond’s mean number of daily trades over 30 and 90 days 
following the issuance date. Time and industry fixed effects are included. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Symbols 













  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
COV-LITE 0.274*** 0.417*** -0.692***  0.175*** 0.335*** -0.840*** 
 (7.960) (4.959) (-7.316)  (4.403) (3.557) (-6.309)         
Maturity 0.009 0.019 -0.051***  0.004 0.013 -0.068*** 
 (1.727) (1.670) (-5.505)  (1.026) (1.243) (-5.817)         
Issuance -0.431*** -1.777*** 0.099*  -0.416*** -1.735*** 0.160** 
 (-9.671) (-11.292) (1.797)  (-12.638) (-10.791) (2.376)         
Beta stock 0.021 0.053 -0.079  0.050* 0.073* -0.089 
 (0.846) (1.084) (-1.435)  (1.992) (1.866) (-1.173)         
Beta bond -0.000 0.005 -0.019*  0.012 0.017 -0.022* 
 (-0.058) (0.215) (-1.786)  (1.236) (0.804) (-1.845)         
Bond market index -0.016 -0.007 0.019  -0.059 -0.009 0.040 
 (-0.385) (-0.257) (0.768)  (-1.483) (-0.338) (0.997)         
CBOE -0.011 -0.010 0.029***  -0.007 -0.013 0.042*** 
 (-1.096) (-1.118) (3.067)  (-1.174) (-1.714) (3.540)         
Number trades -0.004* -0.004 0.002  -0.005*** -0.003 0.002 
 (-1.791) (-1.112) (1.211)  (-3.101) (-0.826) (0.544)         
Constant 8.763* 25.782*** -4.079  13.186*** 25.789*** -8.005* 
  (2.137) (6.464) (-1.573)   (3.134) (6.482) (-2.043) 
Observations 800 800 800   800 800 800 
Adj.R-squared 0.322 0.586 0.470  0.364 0.655 0.446 









This table reports results for the second stage of an instrumental variables model of bond Trading volume, Turnover and Yield 
spread on a cov-lite variable and controls. Trading volume, Turnover and Yield spread are measured over 30 days (columns 1-3) 
or 90 days (columns 4-6) following the bond issuance date. Trading volume is the sum of daily trading volumes over 30 (90) days 
following the bond issuance date divided by the issuance size. Turnover is the daily trading volume relative to the bond issuance 
size, averaged across 30 (90) days from the day of the bond issuance. Yield spread is the log of yield spread measured as the 
median daily yield over 30 (90) days from the bond issuance date minus maturity matched Treasury bond yield. In Panel A, Cov-
lite is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the bond contract lacks the majority of accounting-based incurrence 
covenants, and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, Cov-lite is a continuous variable equal to the natural logarithm of the number of cov-lite 
related covenants missing in the contract. Control variables include the following. Maturity is the bond’s time to maturity in 
years. Issuance amount is the bond’s par value of the amount issued. Beta stock and Beta bond are obtained by regressing weekly 
bond returns on weekly returns on the CRSP value-weighted index and on the Barclays US bond index. Bond market index is the 
weekly return on the Barclays US Corporate Bond Index averaged over 30 and 90 days following the individual bond issue date. 
CBOE is the Chicago Board Options Nasdaq Volatility Index captured from the pricing of the S&P 500 index options. Number 
of trades is the bond’s mean number of daily trades over 30 and 90 days following the issuance date. Time and industry fixed 
effects are included. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Symbols ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 30 days after bond issuance 
 












 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Excluding the financial crisis period 
        
COV-LITE 0.476*** 0.416** -0.547***  0.336*** 0.409*** -0.543*** 
 (3.492) (2.338) (-4.453)  (3.062) (2.752) (-3.507) 
Obs. = 678    
    
Panel B: Cov-lite as continuous variable 
        
COV-LITE 0.831*** 0.820** -0.758***  0.544*** 0.779*** -0.653*** 
 (3.394) (2.317) (-3.138)  (2.782) (2.607) (-2.075) 
Obs.= 800    
    
 
 
 
